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Chapter 6

On the Legal Validation of Sexual
Relationships
RICHARD STITH1
Working within a liberal political paradigm, one that privileges freedom and
equality while eschewing the inculcation of moral excellence for its own
sake, this essay will make two proposals: first, that certain same-sex unions
should be legally validated, and second, that certain different-sex unions
should no longer be legally valid. The former would seem fairly unproblematic, while the latter may be useful as a political compromise despite its
possible costs. More important than either proposal, however, will be the
conceptual clarity (regarding the public interest in marriage) achieved en
route to them.

Non-Validation Is Not Prohibition
In order to prepare the ground for these two proposals, a fundamental
misunderstanding needs to be cleared up: the idea that same-sex marriages
are currently forbidden by law. This issue must be dealt with in advance
because within liberalism all laws limiting freedom are suspect, and a heavy
burden of proof lies upon anyone who wishes to leave them in place. The
starting point for the forthcoming proposals is, however, that no limits are
now placed on freedom to marry, in that same-sex unions are already

1

J.D. Yale Law School, Ph.D. Yale University, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University
(IN). This article modifies and expands Keeping Friendship Unregulated, 18 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 263 (2004). The author gladly acknowledges the able
research assistance of Charles Kohler and Marcus Flinders. [This SSRN version is a
combination of the final draft Word version and the actual published version.
Bracketed numbers in bold refer to the pagination found in the published version.
*The article begins on page 143 of the volume published by Hein.]
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completely legal. Like almost all other human relationships2, they are simply
ignored by the state, and the burden of proof weighs instead upon those who
advocate government registration and regulation of them.
[144]Getting and staying married to someone of one‘s own sex is not
punishable conduct in any modern jurisdiction, as far as research for this
article has been able to uncover.3 True, homosexual sex acts were
traditionally penalized, and that perhaps amounted to a kind of indirect
prohibition on same-sex marriage, but even then religious or non-religious
marriage vows were not themselves necessarily sanctioned. In any event,
courts or legislatures throughout the developed world have largely
eliminated prohibitions on such sex acts and have not replaced them with
legal duties not to make religious or other vows and live together as married.
Thus lack of legal recognition of gay marriage does not in any way limit
conduct, as does ordinary legal prohibition. To say ―gay marriage is
prohibited‖ because its duties are not enforced in court is as incorrect as
saying ―gambling is prohibited‖ because gambling debts are not enforced in
court.
Indeed, it is marriage recognition that limits future behavioral freedom:
Entering into a concurrent marriage now becomes punishable as bigamy;
having sex with someone else may become adultery; divorce may involve
onerous supervision by the state; and the like.4
2

―Relationship‖ here encompasses all ongoing human relations of closeness, support, and
cooperation. But nothing turns on terminology; words such as ―friendship,‖ ―partnership,‖ and the like may be substituted without change of meaning, and are often so
substituted in the course of this article.
3
Although the Human Rights Campaign Foundation states that 42 states have ―anti-gay
marriage‖ statutes, in none of the listed statutes is there a penalty, such as imprisonment
or a fine, for homosexuals living together in a marriage or marriage-like relationship (or
attempting to do so). Human Rights Campaign Foundation, HRC FamilyNet, States with
anti-gay marriage laws, http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_prohibitions_2009.pdf
The only punishment in any state constitution or statute is in Oklahoma where ―Any
person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of this section shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor. Ok. Const. Art. II § 35. But this penalizes the clerk who legally validates
a marriage, not the couple or the relationship itself. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), would seem to nullify any U.S. law (if there were one) that
prohibited homosexuals from making private marriage vows, because such a ban would
―seek to control a personal relationship.‖ Id. at 567, 2478. A few state statutes might
arguably fall into this category. For example, Arizona law states ―Marriage between
persons of the same sex is void and prohibited.‖ ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C)
(Westlaw current through the end of the Forty-Ninth Legislature effective Apr. 24, 2009).
However, the lack of any attached penalty would seem to turn this ―prohibition‖ into little
more than a redundant statement of non-recognition.
4
Marriage recognition may obstruct a participant‘s ability to separate by imposing
divorce proceedings, property division, and alimony; it may limit an individual‘s freedom
to bequeath property upon death; it may make an individual liable for spousal debts; and
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[145]This point may seem so obvious as not to be worth juristic
comment. Media sound-bites referring to gay marriage ―prohibitions‖ may
be the product of lay misunderstandings, or perhaps attempts to fortify the
political arguments in favor of same-sex marriage by making current laws
seem (incorrectly) to attack liberty. But it is an error into which no less a
jurist than United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has fallen.
He imagines that non-validation of same-sex unions amounts somehow to a
prohibition against them. Dissenting in the Lawrence v. Texas case that
struck down criminal laws against homosexual sodomy, Scalia lists laws not
recognizing same-sex marriage right along with laws limiting sexual
conduct:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are … called
into question by today‘s decision … See ante, at 2480 (noting ―an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex‖ (emphasis added [by Justice Scalia])).5

Scalia adds that it is impossible to distinguish homosexual sodomy from
same-sex marriage and ―other traditional ‗morals‘ offenses.‖6 However,
same-sex marriage cannot be a criminal offense as long as it has absolutely
no existence in the eyes of the law. Where the state wholly ignores what
gays and lesbians do with their liberty—e.g. making and maintaining vows
of fidelity—the state is unable to restrict that liberty. Mere behavioral
it may restrict a member‘s sexual partners through social and even criminal norms. (For
instance, adultery—an offense only when a married person is involved—is punishable in
various states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (1992, Westlaw current through the 2009
Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-6-501 (1992, Westlaw current through laws effective
Mar. 25, 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (Westlaw current through 2009 First Reg.
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (1993, Westlaw current through the 2009
1st Annual Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 750.30 (1991, Westlaw current through
2009 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (1993, Westlaw current through 2009).) See
also Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QLR 27 (1996) (arguing that
marriage is more aptly defined by its benefits to government rather than to the married
couple).
5
Supra note 3, at 589, 2490 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6
Id. By contrast, the majority opinion in Lawrence supports the view of this essay that
liberty may require non-punishment of an ongoing personal relationship that preexists
any state action without requiring state validation thereof: ―The statutes [banning homosexual sodomy] seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals.‖ Id. at 567, 2478. Given Scalia‘s ordinary acuity, one cannot but
wonder whether he made his obviously fallacious argument in order to draw the majority
out onto the record with the correct distinction just cited.
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liberty may, of course, not be full social liberty. If I am allowed to go
through the motions of voting, but for some reason am not eligible to have
my vote counted, it seems a joke to tell me my freedom has not been
restricted. When a legislature is disabled from passing unconstitutional
legislation, its liberty is at least as effectively curtailed as would be the case
if it were punished for passing such laws.7 Where the only social point
[146]of an act is to achieve legal validity, the law‘s refusal to validate that
act amounts to a legal prohibition of it.
Yet as H.L.A. Hart has pointed out, denial of legal recognition need not
have a suppressive intent or effect.8 It would be very strange to see the rules
for wills or contracts as draconian means of making testation-without-twowitnesses and promises-without-reciprocity impossible. No modern state
seeks to put an end to deathbed requests to one listener, or to stop unilateral
promising, or to eliminate more solemn extralegal acts such as clerical
ordinations or monastic vows. The law does not validate such acts, but it has
nothing against their having social force.
The difference here is between full ―invalidation‖ and what may be
called mere ―non-validation.‖ The first deprives the non-recognized act of
virtually all significance; the second simply fails to add legal recognition to
what remains a significant social act.9
On which side of the line does non-recognition of committed same-sex
relationships lie? Except for the presumably miniscule number of such
relationships whose only purpose is to obtain some legal benefit not
otherwise obtainable privately10, e.g. a tax break, these friendships surely
carry great weight for those in and around them, quite apart from whether
they achieve legal recognition. They are more like extralegal promises that
matter a great deal than they are like legislation that has been nullified by a

7

For an argument that invalidation may be a more absolute curtailment of liberty than
punishment, because invalidation makes the act in question impossible rather than just
costly, see R. Stith, Punishment, Invalidation, and Nonvalidation: What H.L.A. Hart Did
Not Explain, 14 LEGAL THEORY 219, 221–26 (2008).
8
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26–41 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1994).
9
See article cited supra note 7, where the distinction between invalidation and nonvalidation is explored in greater detail.
10
A great many of the legal responsibilities/benefits of marriage may be already available
to unmarried couples, and may even be imposed on them in the absence of any explicit
contract, regardless of their sexual orientation. See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Chapter 6,
Domestic Partners (2002). For critiques of this new tendency, see Shahar Lifshitz,
Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties, The liberal case for privileging marriage, infra, at
Ch. 7, p. 177, and Helen M. Alvaré, “You Can’t Get There From Here”: A Reply to
Proposals to Disestablish Marriage as the Path to Care,” infra at Ch. 4, p. 71.
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constitution or court. In this they are similar to most committed human
relationships. Our friendships are not generally recognized, registered, or
otherwise validated by the law, but it would be odd to say that the law
―invalidates‖ them. Though they remain non-validated by the law, they are
not debilitated by it.
No humane polity, least of all a liberal one, would want it otherwise.
Only a totalitarian state would seek to regulate, or even to take note of, all
human relationships—be they sexual or non-sexual. The loss of privacy,
freedom, and flexibility, and the cost of the bureaucracy that would acquire
and keep such records, would be too great.
[147]Before the state reaches down into private life to pluck out and
regulate any friendship or other relationship, it should have to show
something unusual about the relationship in question, something that calls
especially for public supervision. In a liberal polity, it is submitted that such
state intervention is justified only when the relationship either conduces
strongly to the common weal or woe, or else endangers vulnerable
individuals too weak to protect themselves. It is by this yardstick that we
now proceed to measure first heterosexual and then homosexual sexual
relationships.

Is There a Public Need for Legal
Validation of Sexual Relationships
between Heterosexuals?
Every modern state maintains a registry of regulated different-sex
unions, i.e. of marriages. At first sight, this may seem odd. Marriage law
may appear to be some hangover from an earlier moral paternalism, rather
than like an instrument of individual freedom; it is so regarded by some
contemporary thinkers.11 It makes no sense, however, to think that liberal,
secular states would go out of their way to restrict freedom for the sake of an
antiquated morality. And if governments were somehow strongly interested
in preserving ancient, quasi-religious customs, why would they always stop
at marriage? Why not officially certify and reinforce the limitations that
result from other spiritually significant relationship events, such as the

11

See, e.g., Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994)
(arguing that marriage lacks legal as well as experiential coherence and is a place-holder
for a series of idealized value judgments about our intimate lives).

RICHARD STITH

aforementioned ordination of priests and ministers or the monastic vow of
stability?12 But no modern state does these things.
Why, then, do governments continue to register and structure heterosexual marriages, if not for the sake of morals or religion? Is there some
compelling reason that could account for state interest in sexual friendship
between women and men, and only in that sort of friendship? Everyone
knows the answer: Sexual relations between women and men may generate
children, beings at once highly vulnerable and essential for the future of
every human community. The good of those children as well as the common
good thus require that the state do all it can to channel such relations into
stable and secure relationships. Vows of lasting monogamy receive public
[148]recognition and reinforcement because they help produce human
beings able to practice ordered liberty.
To the degree that the state is successful in allowing procreation only
within marriage, it furthers at least three important secular purposes: It
enables children to know who their true father is and thus to know on whom
they have a legal and moral claim for support. (The advent of DNA testing
may weaken this reason for faithful marriage, however, by making fathers
easier to identify quite apart from marital vows.) It enables children to have
that true father at home, where he can do them the most good. (Here the
advent of DNA testing may strengthen the need for fidelity in marriage, in
that such testing may overcome old presumptions of paternity and reveal
which husbands are not the true fathers of their wives‘ children.) Perhaps
most importantly, limiting procreation only to married couples stabilizes
long-term coordination between the child‘s two parents, who (if not bound
to one another) might otherwise pull the child in different directions.
Note that the state interest in marriage begins at the point where
potentially fertile persons first engage in intercourse, not at the point when
conception is known to have occurred. By that later time, the father may
have wandered away. He needs to be bound to mother and child from the
beginning. Put another way, heterosexual sexual relationships, without any
outside help or knowledge and without a conscious decision by either
partner, are able to engender children. So there is a public interest in
stabilizing them as soon as intercourse may occur.

12

The Rule of St. Benedict states that when a man or woman is to be received into a
monastery, he or she ―promises before all in the oratory stability, fidelity to monastic life
and obedience‖ (Chapter 58, emphasis added). The Rule requires that someone be
punished ―who would presume to leave the enclosure of the monastery and go anywhere
or do anything, however small, without an order‖ from the abbot or abbess (Chapter 67).
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This secular interest could in theory be implemented through legal
punishment for intercourse outside of monogamous marriage, i.e. penalties
for fornication and adultery. However, in practice legitimate concern for
privacy militates against protecting marriage by penalties for extramarital
sex, except indirectly where a public act is involved (i.e. penalties for
bigamy). But it clearly remains rational for the liberal state to encourage
community moral disapproval of heterosexual sexual acts out of wedlock, at
least as long as contraception is not practiced by almost everyone with high
success.
In any event, as far as the law is concerned, marriage today is strengthened primarily by reward rather than by punishment. The public weal
requires special benefits for marriage in order to attract as many as possible
potentially fertile couples publicly to undertake those commitments that are
best for children. Some couples would not be willing to accept public
involvement (and even control, through support and divorce laws, for
example) in their most intimate concerns if they had no strong incentives to
do so. Furthermore, being sexually faithful and raising children obviously
involve burdens still heavier than putting up with public intrusion in one‘s
intimate life. Since bearing these burdens of time and effort eventually
benefits the whole community, by producing educated and disciplined [149]
citizens, it makes sense for the community to provide concrete rewards in
the form of special tax, social security, and other legal benefits.13 This is
especially true where one spouse—usually the woman, but sometimes the
man—gives up much or all of a career for the sake of raising children. Such
a parent voluntarily shares the vulnerability of her or his children by
becoming a dependent. Justice, the good of the children, and the common
good all demand that the community at least lessen the financial cost of such
self-sacrifice.14
The greatest moral reward of legal marriage remains, even today, the
achievement of full legitimacy for sexual intercourse through the removal of
any remnant of legal or moral disapprobation. Even in communities where
most people do not judge sex outside marriage to be immoral, there is a
minority that still makes this judgment. And, as we have seen, there is a state
13

Included among the benefits married persons enjoy are spousal privilege under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Social Security survivors‘ benefits based upon the spouse‘s
work history, pension benefits, immigration preferences, immunity from Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes on transfers between spouses, health insurance benefits, tort rights in each
other, intestate succession preferences, and conjugal visits. Steven K. Homer, supra note
11, at 515.
14
Thus the Internal Revenue Code adds a special income tax benefit (joint return) for
such households. See I.R.C § 1(a) (2003).
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interest in encouraging this negative evaluation, in order to minimize the
number of children born out of wedlock, so this moral judgmentalism should
never disappear completely. But once a woman and man are married, no one
today, not even the most traditionally-minded person, thinks sexual
intercourse between them to be immoral.
Note that, in the absence of some unusual community desire for an
increase in population, neither procreation, nor marriage, nor sex within
marriage receive special community moral approval. If we think that
parenthood, marriage or sexual intercourse brings happiness, we may well
feel sorry for those who remain childless, single or chaste. But we do not
think them to be immoral or to be second-class citizens. There is little or no
positive moral or civic benefit to getting married or to engaging in marital
sex in the modern world. There is only the complete removal of any prior
community moral disapprobation of sexual intercourse.
Because of the needs of children and the supports for parenting offered
by marriage law and morality, the reasons for getting married become
stronger as the likelihood of children increases. It may be possible for a
different-sex couple very skilled at contraception never to think about
marriage. But once they decide to raise a child together, they will at the least
seriously consider a wedding.
So far, then, modern society‘s linkage between fertility and marriage
seems sensible and consistent. However, if the argument of this essay is
[150]right—that a liberal regime should get into the business of validating
sexual relationships only when necessary to protect children—why would
we permit a marriage begun in the years of youth to last far beyond childbearing age and even permit elderly and other infertile heterosexuals to
begin a new marriage?
Letting marriage last a lifetime is easy to justify. Even adult children
often need their parents for guidance and security in raising the grandchildren. It would also be intrusive and disruptive of ongoing family life, as
well as often unfair to a dependent, non-working spouse, to terminate
marriage automatically as soon as the wife became infertile, thus freeing the
still-fertile husband to get married to a younger woman. Moreover, the law
should do nothing to facilitate an elderly man switching partners and then
begetting children, since he is relatively likely to die before those children
reach adulthood.
Perhaps we could screen people for infertility before letting them
marry. But such screening would probably be a burdensome and politically
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unpalatable search into a private domain.15 And there would sometimes
remain at least a slight chance of a child emerging from heterosexual
relations believed to have been infertile.16
However, where infertility is easy to determine with near certainty in a
non-intrusive way, then the argument so far does indeed cut against new
marriages for infertile heterosexual couples. Where one of the elderly
partners in a sexual relationship is a woman of clearly post-menopausal age,
what possible interest could the state have in their sex life? And if it has no
such interest, why would it offer to marry them? Just to make them privately
happy? That is surely not a special interest of the state in their friendship as
opposed to its interest in the happiness of participants in other non-fertile
relationships. Moreover, the absence of legal marriage would not preclude
religious marriage, or other forms of private mutual commitment, that could
secure their emotional wellbeing and make sexual relations seem morally
permissible and appropriate to them and their peers. Anti-fornication statutes
(should any remain on the books) could nominally be applied to such legally
unrecognized unions, but those laws are rarely if ever enforced. In the
United States they could be held invalid under Lawrence (for here, as in
[151]Lawrence itself, a ―personal relationship‖ would be injured by
enforcement of such statutes).17
The only non-religious explanation for granting elderly couples the
right to get married may be pre-liberal: Even where they are infertile, males
and females can be said to be in their natures (as shown, e.g., by their
anatomy) to be designed for heterosexual reproduction. Every woman is the
proper kind of being to engage in fertile sexual relations: Her body is
designed to conceive a child when fully functioning, even if through age or
illness it has become disabled in part.18 We honor that womanhood in letting
her legally marry, as opposed to insisting that she is now gender-imperfect.
15

There could even be constitutional problems with imposing burdensome conditions on a
right to marry.
16
See Miller v. Rivard, 585 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (male begat child three
months after a fertility test found him sterile) and Lefkowitz v. Nassau County Med. Ctr.,
94 A.D.2d 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (upholding appellant‘s right to refuse a fertility test
on the ground of potential danger, while noting evidence that the test might not produce
conclusive results on the patient‘s fertility).
17
Under Lawrence, supra note 3 at 567, 2478, a state may not ―seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.‖
18
Robert P. George and Gerard V. Bradley summarize the natural law tradition on this
point: ―The marital quality of spousal intercourse is not vitiated … [by] the permanent
loss of fertility with age.‖ Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 n.4, at
301–02 (1995).
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Is a person‘s ―nature‖ (kind, essence, type, design, and the like) an
impermissibly overbroad standard for his or her legal treatment? Is one‘s
current functioning the only valid legal criterion? If so, how can we continue
to consider seriously disabled persons to possess equal human dignity under
the law?
We cannot proclaim human equality at all unless we focus on kind
rather than on the quality of current functioning, for human beings are equal
only in being human beings. That is, we need a fixed category of being
before we can insist that all beings in that category be treated equally. The
fundamental liberal rights to freedom and equality require a pre-liberal
assessment of the kind of being that has to be accorded those rights.19 Not

19

The liberal political theorist John Rawls, for example, turns to a human being‘s nature
(using the words ―capacity,‖ ―realization,‖ ―developed,‖ ―potentiality,‖ and ―could‖)
rather than to his or her current functioning in order to discern the reach of human rights.
Rawls writes that
the minimal requirements defining moral personality refer to a capacity and not to
the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or not it is yet
developed, is to receive the full protection of the principles of justice. Since
infants and children are thought to have basic rights …, this interpretation of the
requisite conditions seems necessary to match our considered judgments. Moreover, regarding the potentiality as sufficient accords … with the idea that as far as
possible the choice of principles should not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies. Therefore it is reasonable to say that those who could take part in the [social
contract], were it not for fortuitous circumstances, are assured equal justice‖
(emphasis added).

A THEORY OF JUSTICE 509 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Immanuel Kant also relies on humanity as an inner essence or nature, present long
before it is fully realized, to indicate who has rights to autonomy. The child is ―a being
endowed with freedom‖ long before it can act freely:
[T]here follows from procreation in [the marital] community a duty to preserve
and care for its offspring.… For the offspring is a person, and it is impossible to
form a concept of the production of a being endowed with freedom through a
physical operation.… They cannot destroy their child as if he were something
they had made (since a being endowed with freedom cannot be a product of this
kind) or as if he were their property, nor can they even just abandon him to
chance, since they have brought not merely a worldly being but a citizen of the
world into a condition which cannot now be indifferent to them even just
according to concepts of right‖ (emphasis in original).

IMMANUEL KANT, Parental Right, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Cambridge Texts in
the History of Philosophy. Mary Gregor ed. & trans., University of South Carolina,
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
For further elaboration of the idea of nature or capacity, in the context of disability
as well as infancy, by means of a contrast between developing and making, see R. STITH,
Construction, Development, and Revelopment, XVII LIFE AND LEARNING 243 (2007),
<http://www.uffl.org/vol17/STITH07.pdf>. For a more extensive discussion of political
fundamentals, see R. Stith, The Priority of Respect: How Our Common Humanity
Grounds Our Individual Dignity, 44 INT‘L PHIL. Q. 165 (2004).
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[152]letting elderly women marry may tend to discredit the thinking in terms
of natural kinds that is essential to a liberal polity.20

Is There a Public Need for Legal
Validation of Sexual Relationships
between Homosexuals?
The child-centered reasons for channeling heterosexual intercourse into
exclusive and stable unions do not apply to sexual acts between persons of
the same sex, since such acts can never generate children.21 Unless some
other characteristic of same-sex couples merits special treatment,22 requires
them to be lifted out of the myriad other sorts of friendships and human
[153]relationships that do not receive legal validation and support, a liberal
state should let their relationships remain wholly private and unregulated.23
This is good and bad news for same-sex couples. The lack of any childrelated reason to confine homosexual acts to committed relationships means
that there is no obvious basis in liberal society for the control of such acts.
Since they are always infertile, gay or lesbian relationships (regardless of the
number or sequence of partners) should not be in any way legally limited in
order to drive and contain such conduct inside stable partnerships. In line

20

Some contemporary philosophers have contended that there are certain ―natural kinds‖
to which our concepts conform. See S. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980). Philosophers of law have also disagreed with the
contention that our concepts are indeterminate. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Law as a
Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (Robert George ed.,
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992).
21
See infra for discussion of adoption by same-sex couples.
22
There might, of course, be some other important public good especially furthered by
committed same-sex friendships. One that comes immediately to mind is the containment
of sexually transmitted diseases. If special civil unions for gays could be shown empirically to be necessary in order significantly to lessen the incidence of AIDS, restructuring
our law to officially support such unions would make some sense.
23
Such was the finding of the very significant French National Assembly report of 25
January 2006 and the ruling by New York‘s highest court on 6 July 2006. Both, of
course, used only non-religious reasons in coming to this conclusion. Parliamentary
Report on the Family and the Rights of Children, 12th Legislature of the French National
Assembly No. 2832 Vol 1, 91 (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.preservemarriage.ca/docs/
France_Report_on_the_Family_Edited.pdf (English version), http://www.assembleenationale.fr/12/rap-info/i2832.asp (original French version) (arguing that sexuality of
inherently infertile relationships is exclusively a private matter, in contrast to the state
interest in fertile relationships); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 374 (2006)
(agreeing with the concept we have seen in Lawrence that consensual relations between
same-sex couple are an exclusively private matter, but where children may be involved a
sexual relationship becomes a legitimate interest to the government).
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with Lawrence, same-sex couples should be liberated from any state
restrictions. Though not equivalent to prohibitions, homosexual marriage
registries could have negative consequences. After all, some gun owners
find simple registration schemes ominous. Ironically, gays and lesbians may
turn out to be better off if they live in traditionally-minded states, where they
are not tempted or pressed24 into surrendering their flexibility and freedom.25
The bad news is of a piece with the good: There is no child-centered
public need to reward fidelity or long-term commitment when it comes to
gay or lesbian sex. There is no special reason for tax subsidies or social
security privileges, for example, to make up for the risk to her career that
marriage often entails for a potentially fertile woman.
Above all, there is no newly appropriate moral approval of sexual
intercourse for those entering into a same-sex partnership. In other words,
there is no reason at all to attempt to draw a line among gay or lesbian sex
acts, disapproving them outside a committed monogamous relationship but
accepting them once they occur inside such a relationship. And in fact,
almost no one makes this distinction. Some persons say homosexual acts are
[154]always morally legitimate; some say they are never legitimate. But few
if any say they are morally permissible only inside a marriage, civil union, or
something similar.
Same-sex commitments thus do not, cannot, and should not, entail the
same sense of new-found moral approval for sexual intercourse as does
traditional marriage. The strong connotation of sexual approval that the word
―marriage‖ carries is for this reason inappropriate and misleading when it is
applied to same-sex unions. Labeling them ―marriages‖ begs the fundamental question animating public debate at least sub rosa, namely whether
homosexual sex itself is morally good or bad. The label ―marriage‖ says
―these sex acts take place within a committed union, so they must be
unobjectionable.‖26 But this is a non-sequitur. Only acts that were illegiti24

See supra note 10.
See Laurie Essig, Same-Sex Marriage: I Don’t Care if It Is Legal, I Still Think It’s
Wrong—And I’m a Lesbian, SALON, July 10, 2000 (suggesting that marriage is an
institution founded in the oppression of women and therefore will also oppress
homosexuals) and Paula Ettlebrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,
OUT/LOOK NAT‘L GAY & LESBIAN Q. (Fall 1989), reprinted in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW, at 723 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1996) (distrusting of state regulation of
sexuality and possessiveness of marriage), and also articles cited supra notes 4 & 11.
26
―From their point of view, same-sex partnership or marriage is a state stamp of approval for homosexuality, which most traditionalists consider deeply immoral.‖ WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
WHAT WE‘VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 132 (Oxford 2006) (arguing in favor of
same-sex marriage). ―Permitting homosexual marriage would be widely interpreted as
25
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mate because they might in the end harm children become more acceptable
in a relatively secure and child-friendly environment. Sex acts among
persons of the same sex have nothing to do with children and so their
morality is properly a private matter, or at most a cultural issue to be
discussed gently within civil society, without regard to marital status.

A Proposal for Civil Unions in the
Case of Joint Adoption
A counter-argument: Are not gay and lesbian unions also potentially fertile,
in that same-sex couples may jointly adopt children in some communities?
Such a question is on the right track in attempting to discern a public interest
in such unions. But the answer to it is ―no.‖ Different-sex unions, without
any outside help or knowledge and without a conscious decision by either
spouse, are able to engender children. So there is a public interest in
stabilizing them as soon as they exist. Same-sex unions in themselves are
absolutely infertile, so there is no possible child-related reason why the
public community should care when they are formed or dissolved, though it
would wish to know if they were to adopt children. If a state decides to
permit same-sex partners jointly to adopt,27 then the point28 at which such
[155]adoptions take place is the moment when such unions need to be
stabilized. In other words, adoption by same-sex couples is a good reason to
grant legal recognition to their unions, but only at the time of each
adoption—not before.29
placing a stamp of approval on homosexuality, while decriminalizing sodomy would not,
or at least not to anywhere near the same extent.‖ Richard A. Posner, SEX AND REASON
309 (1992).
27
For some of the policy issues here, see Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor
Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL‘Y 191 (1995) (arguing for homosexual adoption through the use of social science
data), and Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 UILLR 833 (1997) (arguing that the social impact on children of such radical
changes in the form and structure of the family and in the institution of marriage that is
the basis of the family, and of society, have not been carefully considered).
28
Adoption may also occur by gradual operation of law, e.g. as proposed by the
American Law Institute, supra note 10, section 2.03. If so, a legally recognized bond
between the adopting partners should mature at the same time.
29
Besides protection of potential children and potential caregivers, another reason to
reinforce heterosexual unions ab initio is to make the ascription of paternity more
plausible, as previously discussed. This problem cannot arise in a homosexual union. If
one partner there has a child—e.g., by artificial insemination or other consciously chosen
process—it is known with absolute certainty that the other partner is not the biological
parent. Even if two gay men mix their semen before inseminating a female friend, one of
them can be shown by DNA testing to be the only biological father. The parenthood of
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Put another way: In the case of same-sex couples, it is not the joint
sexual act but the joint adoptive act that is a matter of public interest,
because that is where parenthood may begin. This paper takes no position on
the question of whether or when such joint adoption should take place.30 But
if it does occur, if we decide as a community to entrust the same child to two
adults of the same sex, then we must do everything possible to encourage
those two adults to stay together. The word ―marriage‖ should not be used,
because of its inaccurate and misleading moral meaning in this context, as
discussed above. But strong civil unions should be available, unions with all
the positive supports for stability that are granted to marriage.
Because these adoption-related unions would have nothing directly to
do with the intimate sex lives of the couples concerned, they should be much
less controversial than the more commonly proposed civil unions that have
same-sex sexual activity as an assumed basis. Even those who think gay or
lesbian sexual activity to be morally wrong should agree that a child should
[156]not be pulled in two directions, which is more likely to occur if joint
adoption is permitted without a civil union between the two adopting adults.
This child-centered need, plus the fact that the number of couples eligible for
unions at adoption is likely to be relatively small, assuming that most samesex partnerships do not decide to adopt, would help overcome any qualms
conservatives might have if they still discerned some indirect and mild
public approbation for same-sex acts implied by such legal recognition.
Furthermore, such unions ought to be open to any other two unmarried
adults whom the state decides to entrust with a joint adoption, regardless of
their sexual preference and independent of whether they have any sex at all
with each other—say, two sisters caring for a much younger sibling after
their parents have died. Again, no position is taken here on whether
unmarried heterosexual adults should be able jointly to adopt. But if they
can, a civil union between them would be called for.
the second partner is adoptive and is within the joint control of the partners and the state.
Therefore, the state need not be concerned about reinforcing the bond between a child‘s
potential same-sex parents until the adoption becomes legally effective.
30
One reason for hesitation is this: All agree that at most only a small minority of persons
are genetically predisposed to homosexuality. So the chances are overwhelming that any
child placed with a same-sex couple is going to turn out to be a heterosexual in a family
where the only sexual role models are homosexual. This extremely likely incongruity
does not mean that every adoption by a same-sex couple is worse than any possible adoption by a different-sex couple, but it is at least a negative factor, possibly a strong one. Of
course, the homosexual child growing up with heterosexual parents may be in a similar
plight, but this will happen far less often. (If a ―gay gene‖ or the like could be identified
in an infant before adoptive placement, this objection would clearly disappear, for in that
case each child could be matched with the appropriate sort of parents.)
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Indeed, either marriage or a civil union ought ordinarily to be required,
not just optional, for any sort of joint adoption. We cannot without excessive
social cost stop unattached men and women from conceiving and bearing
children out of wedlock, but there is little reason for the law itself to create
two legally unrelated parents for a single child.

The Continuing Problem of Perceived
or Real Inequality
Yet extending civil unions to jointly adopting same-sex couples may not be
enough for many in the homosexual community. Consider the following
report: In 2007, The New York Times ran a story about parents who had
organized to obtain birth certificates for their stillborn children. They wanted
the state to certify that their children had once existed. ―It‘s about dignity
and validity. It‘s the same reason why we want things like marriage
licenses…,‖ declared a leader.31 The newspaper report does not go into
detail, but one imagines that this movement‘s motivation includes an
element of perceived unfairness: Other children get birth certificates, so why
not ours? Or at least there would not be a demand for stillbirth recognition if
there had not first been a practice of live birth recognition. We all tend to
think we need what others have.
Such pleas tempt the state to extend its power. It would require great selfrestraint on the part of the state for it to resist this offer to let the state be the
ultimate arbiter of truth and being. After all, if government officials do
nothing, they will be blamed and punished politically, so (unless they would
[157]incur large costs in doing so) they might as well extend legal
recognition to stillborn children, even though it serves no public purpose.
Another example: Seeing the way military heroes receive medals and
moral approval, a civilian might well ask for something similar: ―If a soldier
gets a medal for rescuing his buddy from an icy lake, why shouldn‘t my
brother get one for rescuing me? There should be official ‗Family Hero‘
awards. If there aren‘t any, it means the government thinks only soldiers can
be heroic.‖ Surely the right response would be to explain that military
courage is rewarded because of the special public interest in it, not because it
is thought morally superior to civilian courage. And one might recall that
illiberal polities that officially reward civilian heroism, or other forms of
31

Tamar Lewin, Out of Grief Grows an Advocacy for Legal Certificate of Stillborn Birth,
NEW YORK TIMES, May 22, 2007, p. A16 (quoting the woman ―who started the
movement‖).
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moral excellence for its own sake, would in the end not be ones most of us
would wish ours to emulate.
So it should be for same-sex couples who feel slighted by not being
offered legal validation. A liberal state should explain that the law is in no
way against their union; there is just no special public interest in its
recognition, control, or support. And, to the extent possible, it is a good idea
to keep friendship unregulated.
Such explanations will ring hollow, however, if there are large and
obvious groups who are rewarded with medals or marriages despite the fact
that they serve no obvious public purpose. If bullfighters get bravery badges,
why not brothers? If aged heterosexuals are permitted to marry, why not
homosexuals?
True, as was argued above, new marriages for the elderly can be
supported for a wholly secular reason: as a way to maintain the pre-liberal
foundation of liberal society, its necessary basis in natural law thinking.
However, this response has two strikes against it: First, the argument for
letting infertile different-sex people marry because their ―natures‖ are still
the right kind for marital sex is subtle; it may not convince everyone.
Second, and more important, natural law arguments are something the gay
rights movement is seeking to counter. Natural law thinking is the main nonreligious support for the claim that homosexual sex is wrong, i.e. that it is in
the nature of men and women to have sexual relations only with one another.
Thus the pejorative label of ―unnatural acts‖ was long attached to sex
between persons of the same sex.32 An appeal to our sexual natures is likely
to carry little weight in the homosexual community.
[158]With an appeal to the wisdom of human nature closed off, there
remain only two ways to eliminate the apparent unfairness in the law‘s
disparate treatment of homosexuals and equally infertile heterosexuals:
Either same-sex couples can be granted the right to marry or infertile
different-sex couples can have that right taken away from them. It will be
contended below that the former alternative would greatly harm society and
so the latter should be chosen despite its own costs.
32

Sexual union (commercium sexuale) is the reciprocal use that one human being
makes of the sexual organs and capacities of another (usus membrorum et
facultatum sexualium alterius). This is either a natural use (by which procreation
of a being of the same kind is possible) or an unnatural use, and unnatural use
takes place either with a person of the same sex or with an animal of a nonhuman
species…. [S]uch transgressions … called unnatural (crimina carnis contra
naturam) … do wrong to humanity in our own person…‖ (emphasis in original)

Kant, Marriage Right, supra note 19, at 61–62.
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Negative Consequences of the
Legal Validation of Sexual Relationships
between Homosexuals
This article has not yet contended that validation of same-sex marriage is
worse for society than any other sort of unnecessary government intervention, e.g., the issuing of certificates for stillbirths. Arguments in favor of
validation have been countered, but no claim has yet been made that legal
recognition of same-sex marriage is especially damaging.
However, the harms caused by such recognition are in fact quite
significant. Perhaps most obviously, it is unjust to the community as a whole
that the public purse be used to subsidize couples that do not, as couples,
equally serve the common good. Those subsidies were set up to encourage
and support unions that are apt to generate children. It is not right to siphon
these benefits off and pass them on to people to use largely for their private
benefit.
Furthermore, to reward some private relationships would be unjust to
many remaining unsubsidized relationships. If providing emotional security
(or division of labor or economies of scale or some other such private
benefit) were considered a sufficient reason to recognize same-sex couples,
why not groups of three, four or fourteen? And why limit official unions to
those based on sex? In fact, how could any sort of important human
relationship fairly remain unregistrable?
David Chambers of the University of Michigan Law School, in an
article favoring same-sex marriage, has written:
[W]e should respect the…claims made against the hegemony of the twoperson unit…If the law of marriage can be seen as facilitating the
opportunities of two people to live an emotional life that they find
satisfying—rather than as imposing a view of proper relationships—the
law ought to be able to achieve the same for units of more than two….By
[159]ceasing to conceive of marriage as a partnership composed of one
person of each sex, the state may become more receptive to units of three
or more…and to units composed of two people of the same sex but who
are bound by friendship alone.33
33

David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 490–91 (1996). Another
proposal to use gay marriage as a stepping stone to the validation of sexual and nonsexual group marriages can be found, signed by important leaders such as Gloria
Steinem, Barbara Ehrenreich, and Cornell West, in ―Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New
Strategic Vision for All our Families and Relationships‖ at http//:www.beyondmarriage.
org (last visited 9 March 2009). See also Kees Waaldijk, Taking Same-Sex Partnership
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What would happen if we took Professor Chambers‘ advice and offered
generous public benefits to every emotionally satisfying, long-term relationship? Would not the direct and indirect costs rise so high that they could no
longer be paid? And consider again not only the economic costs, but also the
quality of civil society. Do we really want a Rhode Island Relationship
Registry? Even if the government used mainly positive incentives, rather
than penalties, to support its scheme, would there not be too great an
intrusion into private life? Would we not have lost too much freedom and
flexibility in our personal relationships? Would we not have created an
excessive bureaucracy?
Besides its unfairness to taxpayers and to other sorts of friendships, the
validation of same-sex marriage would be deeply unjust in another way that
stillbirth certificates and bravery badges would not be: The state would have
weighed in unnecessarily on one side of a profound moral controversy about
sexual identity and the meaning of sexual activity. Traditional natural law
morality argues that our sexual fulfillment lies in engaging in only the sort of
sex acts for which we are designed in mind and body, namely intercourse
within committed different-sex marriage. Only there are the normal
consequences of intercourse benign and beneficial for all concerned; going
against our marital nature leads to harm all around. Same-sex relations, by
contrast, assume a different purpose for sex acts, namely mutual enjoyment
[160]and any bond of friendship that they may strengthen. No sort of
orgasmic pleasure is more appropriate than another. Gender itself is a facet
not of our dual-sexed common human nature but of each separate
individual.34
Seriously: European Experiences as British Perspectives, INT‘L FAMILY LAW 14 (June
2003), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/handle/1887/5229 (stating that same-sex
couples who are non-sexual should be permitted to participate in civil unions).
Some conservatives have also welcomed (at least as a compromise) an expansion
of legal recognition and support to many sorts of non-sexual friendships despite its
obvious costs, apparently because (along with the absence of the word ―marriage‖) the
removal of sexuality from the definition of such unions would lessen any implication of
approval for the sort of sex acts practiced within them. See Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif
Girgis, A Real Compromise on the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: An Invitation to Rauch
and Blankenthorn, PUBLIC DISCOURSE: ETHICS, LAW, AND THE COMMON GOOD (Feb 24,
2009), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/viewarticle.php?selectedarticle=2009.02.24.
001.pdart.
34
The common but contrary argument that homosexuality is genetically predetermined is
an anomaly in post-modern thought. If gender is otherwise entirely flexible, why would
same-sex identity alone be fixed? If our genetic status as men or women does not limit
our sexuality, why would our same-sex genetic predispositions do so? Without in any
way seeking to judge the empirical validity of the claims here on either side, one can
easily discern political reasons for the argument for irrevocable genetic predetermination
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It is wrong for a liberal state to intervene in debates concerning natural
right and wrong, except insofar as may be necessary to secure the
foundations of equal liberty. Decisions on the meaning of sexual intercourse
ought in principle to be handled in private, or in civil society (books,
movies, school debates, church teachings, and the like). It is unfair for the
liberal state to use force to settle a merely cultural controversy, no matter
how much it is pressed to do so.35 And the mandatory fiat of the state makes
it less likely that the outcome will be determined only by the most
appropriate reasons.
Moreover, if the claim made earlier is correct, that natural law thinking
(thinking in terms of kinds or natures) is a necessary pre-liberal basis for the
liberal commitment to human dignity and equality, then there is a public
interest in seeing that this sort of thinking (at least in that context) does not
disappear. But sex is one of the places where the word ―natural‖ is most at
home, where it comes most easily to the minds of many. To appear legally to
endorse the view that nothing is more sexually natural or unnatural than
anything else could endanger the pre-liberal foundation of liberalism.
Furthermore, by validating one side of a moral argument for which
there exists no consensus and for which empirical proof of superiority may
be difficult, the state does what is functionally equivalent to establishing a
controverted religion. The problem here is not just unfairness but tyranny.
[161]Without sufficient basis in public reason to convince those who do not
believe in the new doctrine, the state must inevitably resort to propaganda
and force.
If gays can get married, there must be nothing wrong with gay sex, and
so those adoption agencies, hospitals, schools, radio stations, and the like
that act upon (or even simply teach) other premises are just bigoted and

of same-sex orientation: The argument operates within the natural law paradigm,
asserting that gay and lesbian people simply have a different nature, are a different kind
of being from heterosexuals. Thus their sexual orientation should be seen not as a genetic
deficiency to be overcome or limited, like an inborn tendency to alcoholism, but as
something to be supported and perfected. If this argument were able to convince the
opponents of same-sex relations, then the state might indeed be able to license same-sex
civil unions without appearing to take sides against natural law morality.
35
Kathleen E. Hull writes that in her interviews with those who favor same-sex marriage,
―[a]lthough rights and equality were important ways of talking about the value of samesex marriage, study participants were just as likely to talk about it in the language of
social legitimacy and validation.‖ She quotes one person saying ―I think [legal recognition] would go a long way to legitimizing our relationships, in the eyes of other people‖
and another saying ―I want the government to do it, so all these people, they can just shut
up!‖ SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND LAW 126–27
(Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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entitled to no public support, and perhaps not even to toleration.36 Religious
exemptions could mitigate this tendency to statist domination of civil
society,37 but non-religious persons and institutions responding only to their
understanding of what is naturally good for men, women, and children,
could still be pressed to violate their consciences.
The difficulty here lies in the very idea of validation. Legal ―recognition‖ in the sense used in this article is not just the notice of a fact. It is a
communal imprimatur. It may not go so far as to make the act in question
mandatory, but it does aver that there is nothing significantly wrong with it.
True tolerance, by contrast, takes no position in favor or against the act
or relationship in question. It leaves others with full behavioral liberty to
engage in the conduct, without endorsing what they do in any way.
Gamblers may be left at liberty without affirming that what they are doing is
a good thing. But the legal validation of gambling debts affirms that public
policy supports them.
It is of utmost importance for peace in a liberal polity that same-sex
activity remain not prohibited but also not legally validated. Almost all
citizens rejoice in the freedom and equality of a liberal political order. But
many could not accept the establishment and enforcement of a contested
moral order, even if it were a liberal one.
The great political problem is that toleration alone may no longer
satisfy the gay rights movement. John Noonan has reflected upon how
slavery and abortion became polity-shattering only when advocates for each
cause escalated their demands from simple toleration to universal legal
approval. Yet he also recognizes their difficulty in moderating those
demands: ―[I]n a moral question of this kind, turning on basic concepts of
humanity, … you cannot be content with the practical toleration of your
[162]activities. You want, in a sense you need, actual acceptance, open
approval, … the moral surrender of [your] critics.‖38
It behooves us all to find a way out of the impasse described by
Noonan, a way generously to accommodate both sensibilities, in order to
36

See the important book by legal scholars both for and against same-sex marriage:
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds. 2008) (arguing that legal
recognition of same-sex marriage may lead to limits on speech at work and in school, to
restrictions on licenses and conscience in the professions, and to a widespread intolerance
for a different ethical vision).
37
This is the tack taken by conservative David Blankenhorn and liberal Jonathan Rauch
in A Reconciliation on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK11.
38
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES 82–
83 (The Free Press, 1979).
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avoid yet another sort of civil war. Is there something more than ―practical
toleration‖ that traditionalists can offer, something less than ―moral
surrender‖ that can satisfy same-sex marriage advocates?

A Proposal for the Non-Validation of New
Marriages of Elderly Couples
The disestablishmentarian position of this essay requires an obvious second
step: The application of natural law morality to marriage, which now
appears to many to be gratuitously endorsed by the state, must be excised in
some dramatic way from our law. Even though, as I believe, current
marriage law can in fact be justified on premises necessary for a liberal
polity, those secular arguments are insufficiently convincing to many
reasonable persons. Simple toleration of what gays and lesbians do privately
with their liberty, even with the addition of public validation for same-sex
unions that adopt, may not be adequate to avert ―civil war.‖ In order to
persuade those who favor same-sex marriage that they are being treated
fairly, contrary natural law marriage principles may need to be significantly
removed from our law.
More specifically: as long as every major sort of infertile heterosexual
can get legally married, no matter how obvious and permanent that infertility
may be, current law will seem arbitrarily to establish the moral or religious
judgment that homosexual activity is bad. This sense of official unfairness
among persons and among moralities may require that marriages of
obviously infertile heterosexuals no longer be legally recognized.
As previously discussed, the one sort of infertility which is already a
matter of public record, and which therefore would require no great invasion
of privacy to use as a legal criterion for infertility, is age. Past a certain age,
women become overwhelmingly infertile. The proposal made here is for the
law to choose some age (50?, 60?, 70?—let us decide) beyond which
marriage would not be recognized for any couple, on grounds of infertility.39
[163]In order not to discriminate against women in the course of
undoing discrimination against homosexuals, the law should treat both sexes
equally: Only when both the would-be husband and the would-be wife are
39

Conservative thinker Allan Carlson postulates that if people were given civil marriage
benefits only during their ‗natural‘ time of procreative potential, there would be a
possible reconnect of procreation with marriage. He proposes the age of forty-five or
younger for women, as their ‗natural‘ age, while approximating an age in men, due to
Viagra and the like, would be more difficult. See ALLAN C. CARLSON, CONJUGAL
AMERICA: ON THE PUBLIC PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE 18–19 (Transaction Pub, 2006).
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above the officially set age should their vows have no legal significance.
(The other sort of equal treatment of sex would be a mistake: To say that if
either the male or the female were above the set age they could not marry
would leave those children engendered by an older man and a younger
woman without the protection of a marriage bond between their parents.)
It is true that a post-menopausal (and thus presumptively infertile)
woman could still marry a younger man under this proposal, which would
leave marriage law imperfectly mapped onto potential fertility, but there is
no other acceptable solution that does not give older men more rights than
older women.
There is one other way in which marriage law should not be quite absolute in its exclusion of legal matrimony for elderly women. Whatever age is
chosen, it is possible in theory for some very unusual woman to remain
fertile after that age. Therefore, the elimination of heterosexual marriage
after some certain age should be subject to an exception. Where the female
partner is already pregnant, marriage should be permitted, as in the shotgun
marriages of old, so that the child will at least be born in wedlock.40
Would this age-based proposal be politically sufficient (along with the
proposal for civil unions joining any same-sex couples who adopt) to
overcome the common sense of legal unfairness toward homosexuals? One
cannot know, but its enactment would at least be a significant step on the
part of the law to tailor marriage more closely to fertility. Same-sex people
would no longer feel alone in not having their sexual relationships validated
by
the
state.

40

If IVF treatments continue to advance, it could even become common for postmenopausal women to become pregnant. Once again, this paper takes no position on
whether such impregnations should or should not be allowed by law or morality. But if
they are ever permitted, the protection of children requires that marriage be made
available once they successfully occur.

